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Abstract
There has been considerable recent interest in “cloud storage” wherein a user asks a
server to store a large file. One issue is whether the user can verify that the server is
actually storing the file, and typically a challenge-response protocol is employed to convince
the user that the file is indeed being stored correctly. The security of these schemes is
phrased in terms of an extractor which will recover the file given any “proving algorithm”
that has a sufficiently high success probability. This forms the basis of proof-of-retrievability
(PoR) systems.
In this paper, we study multiple server PoR systems. We formalize security definitions for
two possible scenarios: (i) when a threshold of servers succeed with high enough probability
(worst-case) and (ii) when the average of the success probability of all the servers is above
a threshold (average-case). We also motivate the study of confidentiality of the outsourced
message. We give MPoR schemes which are secure under both these security definitions
and provide reasonable confidentiality guarantees even when there is no restriction on the
computational power of the servers. We also show how classical statistical techniques used
by Paterson, Stinson and Upadhyay (Journal of Mathematical Cryptology: 7(3)) can be
extended to evaluate whether the responses of the provers are accurate enough to permit
successful extraction. We also look at one specific instantiation of our construction when
instantiated with the unconditionally secure version of the Shacham-Waters scheme (Asi-
acrypt, 2008). This scheme gives reasonable security and privacy guarantee. We show that,
in the multi-server setting with computationally unbounded provers, one can overcome the
limitation that the verifier needs to store as much secret information as the provers.
1 Introduction
In the recent past, there has been a lot of activity on remote storage and the associated
cryptographic problem of integrity of the stored data. This question becomes even more
important when there are reasons to believe that the remote servers might act maliciously,
i.e., one or more servers can delete (whether accidentally or on purpose) a part of the data
since there is a good chance that the data will never be accessed and, hence, the client would
never find out! In order to assuage such concerns, one would prefer to have a simple auditing
system that convinces the client if and only if the server has the data. Such audit protocols,
called proof-of-retrievability (PoR) systems, were introduced by Juels and Kaliski [13], and
closely related proof-of-data-possession (PDP) systems were introduced by Ateniese et al. [4].
In a PoR protocol, a client stores a message m on a remote server and keeps only a
short private fingerprint locally. At some later time, when the client wishes to verify the
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integrity of its message, it can run an audit protocol in which it acts as a verifier while
the server proves that it has the client’s data. The formal security of a PoR protocol is
expressed in terms of an extractor – there exists an extractor with (black-box or non-black
box) access to the proving algorithm used by the server to respond to the client’s challenge,
such that the extractor retrieves the original message given any adversarial server which
passes the audits with a threshold probability. Apart from this security requirement, two
practical requirements of any PoR system would be to have a reasonable bound on the
communication cost of every audit and small storage overhead on both the client and server.
PoR systems were originally defined for the single-server setting. However, in the real
world, it is highly likely that a client would store its data on more than one server. This
might be due to a variety of reasons. For example, a client might wish to have a certain
degree of redundancy if one or more servers fails. In this case, the client is more likely to
store multiple copies of the same data. Another possible scenario could be that the client
does not trust a single server with all of its data. In this case, the client might distribute
the data across multiple servers. Both of these settings have been studied previously in the
literature.
The first such study was initiated by Curtmola et al. [11], who considered the first of the
above two cases. They addressed the problem of storing copies of a single file on multiple
servers. This is an attractive solution considering the fact that replication is a fundamental
principle in ensuring the availability and durability of data. Their system allows the client
to audit a subset of servers even if some of them collude.
On the other hand, Bowers, Juels, and Oprea [10] considered the second of the above two
cases. They studied a system where the client’s data is distributed and stored on different
servers. This ensures that none of the servers has the whole data.
Both of these systems covered one specific instance of the wide spectrum of possibilities
when more than one server is involved. For example, none of the works mentioned above
addresses the question of the privacy of data. Both of them argue that, for privacy, the client
can encrypt its file before storing it on the servers. These systems are secure only in the
computational setting and the privacy guarantee is dependent on the underlying encryption
scheme. On the other hand, there are known primitives in the setting of distributed systems,
like secret sharing schemes, that are known to be unconditionally secure. Moreover, we can
also utilize cross-server redundancy to get more practical systems.
1.1 Our Contributions
In Section 2, we give the formal description of multi-server PoR (MPoR) systems. We state
the definitions for worst-case and the average-case secure MPoR systems. We also motivate
the privacy requirement and state the privacy definition for MPoR systems. In Section 3,
we define various primitives to the level required to understand this paper.
In Section 4, we give a construction of an MPoR scheme that achieves worst-case security
when the malicious servers are computationally unbounded. Our construction is based on
ramp schemes and a single-server PoR scheme. Our construction achieves confidentiality of
the message. To exemplify our scheme, we instantiate this scheme with a specific form of
ramp scheme.
In Section 5, we give a construction of an MPoR scheme that achieves average-case
security against computationally unbounded adversaries. For an MPoR system that affords
average-case security, we also show that an extension of classical statistical techniques used
by Paterson, Stinson and Upadhyay [17] can be used to provide a basis for estimating
whether the responses of the servers are accurate enough to allow successful extraction.
One of the benefits of an MPoR system is that it provides cross-server redundancy. In
the past, this feature has been used by Bowers et al. [10] to propose a multi-server system
called HAIL. We first note that the constructions in Section 4 and Section 5 do not provide
any improvement on the storage overhead of the server or the client. In Section 6, we give
a construction based on the Shacham-Waters protocol [18] that allows significant reduction
of the storage overhead of the client in the multi-server setting.
2
1.2 Related Works
The concept of proof-of-retrievability is due to Juels and Kaliski [13]. A PoR scheme incor-
porates a challenge-response protocol in which a verifier can check that a message is being
stored correctly, along with an extractor that will actually reconstruct the message, given
the algorithm of a “prover” who is able to correctly respond to a sufficiently high percentage
of challenges.
There are also papers that describe the closely related (but slightly weaker) idea of
a proof-of-data-possession scheme (PDP scheme), e.g., [4]. A PDP scheme permits the
possibility that not all of the message blocks can be reconstructed. Ateniese et al. [4]
also introduced the idea of using homomorphic authenticators to reduce the communication
complexity of the system. This scheme was improved in a follow-up work by Ateniese et
al. [6]. Shacham and Waters [18] later showed that the scheme of Ateniese et al. [3] can be
transformed into a PoR scheme by constructing an extractor that extracts the file from the
responses of the Prover on the audits.
Bowers, Juels, and Oprea [10] extended the idea of Juels and Kaliski [13] and used error-
correcting codes. The main difference in their construction is that they use the idea of an
“outer” and an “inner” code (in the same vein as concatenated codes), to get a good balance
between the extra storage overhead and computational overhead in responding to the audits.
Dodis, Vadhan, and Wichs [12] provided the first example of an unconditionally secure PoR
scheme, also constructed from an error-correcting code, with extraction performed through
list decoding in conjunction with the use of an almost-universal hash function. They also give
different constructions depending on the computational capabilities of the server. Paterson
et al. [17] studied PoR schemes in the setting of unconditional security, and showed some
close connections to error-correcting codes.
Recently, Ateniese et al. [7] defined the framework of proof-of-storage systems to under-
stand PDP and PoR system in a unified manner. They argue that existing PoR [18] and
PDP [4] schemes can be seen as an instantiation of their framework. They used homomor-
phic identification schemes to give efficient proof-of-storage systems in the random-oracle
model. They further exhibited that existing constructions of PoR and PDP schemes are
specific instantiation of their construction. Wang et al. [21] gave the first privacy preserving
public auditable proof-of-storage systems. We refer the readers to the survey by Kamara
and Lauter [14] regarding the architecture of proof-of-storage systems.
Distributed Cloud Computing. All the constructions mentioned above considered
single server system; however, such systems are prone to failure leading to catastrophic
problems [2].
However, proof-of-storage systems have been also studied in the setting where there is
more than one server or more than one client. The first such setting was studied by Curtmola
et al. [11]. They studied a multiple replica PDP system, which is the natural generalization
of single server PDP system to t servers.
Bowers et al. [10] introduced a distributed system that they called HAIL. Their system
allows a set of provers to prove the integrity of a file stored by a client. The idea in HAIL
is to exploit the cross-prover redundancy. They considered an active and mobile adversary
that can corrupt the whole set of provers.
Recently, Ateniese et al. [5] considered the problem from the client side, where n clients
store their respective files on a single prover in a manner such that the verification of the
integrity of a single client’s file simultaneously gives the integrity guarantee of the files of all
the participating clients. They called such a system an entangled cloud storage.
1.3 Comparison with Bowers, Juels, and Oprea
The focus of this paper is PoR systems in the distributed setting; therefore, we only compare
our work with existing works in the distributed setting. The scheme of Curtmola et al. [11]
only considers multiple replica of the same underlying PDP systems, while the construction
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of Ateniese et al. [5] is for the multiple clients setting. In other words, the scheme of Bowers,
Juels, and Oprea [10] is closest to ours. However, there are a few key differences:
1. The construction of Bowers, Juels, and Oprea [10] is secure only in the computational
setting, while we provide security in the setting of unconditional security.
2. Bowers, Juels, and Oprea [10] use various tools and algorithms to construct their
systems, including error-correcting codes, pseudo-random functions, message authen-
tication codes, and universal hash function families. On the other hand, we only use
ramp schemes in our constructions, making our schemes easier to state and analyze,
and arguably simpler to implement.
3. We consider two types of security guarantees, namely, the worst-case scenario and the
average-case scenario. On the other hand, Bowers, Juels, and Oprea [10] only consider
worst-case scenario.
4. The construction of Bowers, Juels, and Oprea [10] only aims to protect the integrity
of the message, while we consider both the privacy and integrity of the message. Pri-
vacy of data has emerged as an important requirement in cloud storage due to recent
attacks [1].
5. We work under a stronger requirement than [10] – we require extraction to succeed
with probability equal to 1, whereas in [10], extraction succeeds with probability close
to 1, depending in part on properties of a certain class of hash functions used in the
protocol.
We use the term Prover to identify any server that stores the file of a client. We use the
term Verifier for any entity that verifies whether the file of a client is stored properly or not
by the server. We also assume that a file is composed of message blocks of an appropriate
fixed length. If the file consists of single block, we simply call it the file.
2 Security Model of Multi-server PoR systems
The essential components of multi-server-PoR (MPoR) systems are natural generalizations
of single-server PoR systems. The first difference is that there are ρ provers and the Verifier
might store different messages on each of them. Also, during an audit phase, the Verifier
can pick a subset of provers on which it runs the audits. The last crucial difference is
that the Extractor has (black-box or non-black-box) access to a subset of proving algorithms
corresponding to the provers that the Verifier picked to audit. We detail them below for the
sake of completeness.
Let Prover1, . . . ,Proverρ be a set of ρ provers and let Verifier be the verifier. The
Verifier has a message m ∈M from the message space M which he redundantly encodes to
M1, . . . ,Mρ.
1. In the keyed setting, the Verifier picks ρ different keys (K1, . . . ,Kρ), one for each of
the corresponding provers.
2. The Verifier gives Mi to Proveri. In the case of a keyed scheme, Proveri may be also
given an additional tag Si generated using the key, Ki, and Mi.
3. The Verifier stores some sort of information (say a fingerprint of the encoded message)
which allows him to verify the responses made by the provers.
4. On receiving the encoded message Mi, Proveri generates a proving algorithm Pi, which
it uses to generate its responses during the auditing phase.
5. At any time, Verifier picks an index i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ `, and engages in a challenge-
response protocol with Proveri. In one execution of challenge-response protocol, Verifier
picks a challenge c and gives it to Proveri, and the prover responds with %. The Verifier
then verifies the correctness of the response (based on its fingerprint).
6. The success probability succ(Pi) is the probability, computed over all the challenges,
with which the Verifier accepts the response sent by Proveri.
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7. The Extractor is given a subset S of the proving algorithms P1, . . . ,Pρ (and in the case
of a keyed scheme, the corresponding subset of the keys, {Ki : i ∈ S}), and outputs a
message m̂. The Extractor succeeds if m̂ = m.
The above framework does not restrict any provers from interacting with other provers
when they receive the encoded message. However, we assume that they do not interact after
they have generated a proving algorithm. If we do not include this restriction, then it is
not hard to see that one cannot have any meaningful protocol. For example, if provers can
interact after they receive the encoded message, then it is possible that one prover stores
the entire message and the other provers just relay the challenges to this specific prover and
relay back its response to the verifier.
In contrast to a single-prover PoR scheme, there are two possible ways in which one can
define the security of a multiple prover PoR system. We define them next.
The first security definition corresponds to the “worst case” scenario and is the natural
generalization of a single-server PoR system.
Definition 2.1. A ρ-prover MPoR scheme is (η, ν, τ, ρ)-threshold secure if there is an
Extractor which, when given any τ proving algorithms, say Pi1 , . . .Piτ , succeeds with proba-
bility at least ν whenever
succ(Pj) ≥ η for all j ∈ I,
where I = {i1, . . . , iτ}.
We note that when ρ = τ = 1, we get a standard single-server PoR system. Moreover, the
definition captures the worst-case scenario in the sense that it only guarantees extraction if
there exists a set of τ proving algorithms, all of which succeed with high enough probability.
The above definition requires that all the τ servers succeed with high enough probability.
On the other hand, it might not be the case that all the proving algorithms of the servers
picked by the Verifier succeed with the required probability. In fact, even verifying whether
or not all the τ proving algorithms have high enough success probability to allow successful
extraction might be difficult (see, for example [17] for more details about this). However,
it is possible that some of the proving algorithms succeed with high enough probability to
compensate for the failure of the rest of the proving algorithms. For instance, since the
provers are allowed to interact before they specify their proving algorithms, it might be the
case that the colluding provers decide to store most of the message on a single prover. In
this case, even a weaker guarantee that the average success probability is high enough might
be sufficient to guarantee a successful extraction. In other words, it is possible to state (and
as we show in this paper, achieve) a security guarantee with respect to the average case
success probability over all the proving algorithms.
Definition 2.2. A ρ-prover MPoR scheme is (η, ν, ρ)-average secure if the Extractor succeeds
with probability at least ν whenever
1
ρ
ρ∑
i=1
succ(Pi) ≥ η.
Note that the average-case secure system reduces to the standard PoR scheme (with
τ = ρ) when ρ = 1. The following example illustrates that average-case security is possible
even when an MPoR system is not possible as per Definition 2.1.
Example 2.3. Suppose η = 0.7, ν = 0 and ρ = 3. Further, suppose that succ(P1) =
0.9, succ(P2) = 0.6 and succ(P3) = 0.6. Then the hypotheses of Definition 2.1 are not
satisfied for τ = 2. So even if the MPoR scheme is (η, ν, τ, ρ)-threshold secure, we cannot
conclude that the Extractor will succeed. On the other hand, for the assumed success prob-
abilities, the hypotheses of Definition 2.2 are satisfied. Therefore, if the MPoR scheme is
(0.7, ν, τ)-average secure, the Extractor will succeed.
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Privacy Guarantee. We mentioned at the start of this section that PoR systems were
introduced and studied to give assurance of the integrity of the data stored on remote
storage. However, the confidentially aspects of data have not been studied formally in the
area of cloud-based PoR systems. There have been couple of ad hoc solutions that have
been proposed in which the messages are encrypted and then stored on the cloud [11]. We
believe that, in addition to the standard integrity requirement, privacy of the stored data
when multiple provers are involved is also an important requirement. We model the privacy
requirement as follows:
Definition 2.4. An MPoR system is called t-private if no set A of adversarial provers of
size at most t learns anything about the message stored by the Verifier.
Note that t = 0 corresponds to the case when the MPoR system does not provide any
confidentiality to the message. The above definition captures the idea that, even if t provers
collude, they do not learn anything about the message. We remark that we can achieve
confidentiality without encrypting the message by using secret sharing techniques.
Notation. We fix the letter m for the original message, M to denote the space from
which the message m is picked, and M to denote the encoded message. We fix ν to denote
the failure probability of the extractor and η to denote the success probability of a proving
algorithm. In this paper, we are mainly interested in the case when ν = 0 for both the
worst-case and the average-case security. We use n to denote the number of message blocks,
assuming the underlying PoR system breaks the message into blocks.
3 Primitives Used in This Paper
3.1 Ramp Schemes
In our construction, we use a primitive related to secret sharing schemes known as ramp
schemes. A secret sharing scheme allows a trusted dealer to share a secret between n players
so that certain subsets of players can reconstruct the secret from the shares they hold [8, 19].
It is well-known that the size of each player’s share in a secret sharing scheme must be
at least the size of the secret. If the secret that is to be shared is large, then this constraint
can be very restrictive. Schemes for which we can get a certain form of trade-off between
share size and security are known as ramp schemes [9].
Definition 3.1. (Ramp Scheme). Let τ1, τ2, and n be positive integers such that τ1 < τ2 ≤
n. A (τ1, τ2, n)-ramp scheme is a pair of algorithms, say ShareGen and Reconstruct, such
that, on input a secret S, ShareGen(S) generates n shares, one for each of the n players, such
that the following two properties hold: (i) Reconstruction: any subset of τ2 or more players
can pool together their shares and use Reconstruct to compute the secret S from the shares
that they collectively hold, and (ii) Secrecy: no subset of τ1 or fewer players can determine
any information about the secret S.
Example 3.2. Suppose the dealer wishes to set up (2, 4, n)-ramp scheme with the secret
(a0, a1). The dealer picks a finite field Fq with q > n such that a0, a1 ∈ Fq. The dealer
picks random elements a2, a3 independently from the field Fq and construct the following
polynomial of degree 3 over the finite field Fq: f(x) = a0 + a1x + a2x2 + a3x3. The share
for any player Pi is generated by computing si = f(i). It is easy to see that if two or
fewer players come together, they do not learn any information about the secret, and if at
least four players come together, they can use Lagrange’s interpolation formula to compute
the function f as well as the secret. However, if three players pool together their shares,
then they can learn some partial information about one of the other player’s share. For
concreteness, let q = 17. Then 5a1 ≡ 7s3 + 9s6 + s15 mod 17; therefore, players P3,P6,
and P15 can compute the value of a1.
For completeness, we review some of the basic theory concerning the construction of ramp
schemes. Linear codes have been used to construct ramp-schemes for over thirty years since
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1. On input P, compute the vector R′ = (r′c : c ∈ Γ), where
r′c = P(c) for all c ∈ Γ (i.e., for every c, r′c is the response
computed by P when it is given the challenge c).
2. Find M̂ ∈M∗ so that dist(R′, rM̂ ) is minimised.
3. Output m̂ = e−1(M̂).
Figure 1: Extractor for Theorem 3.6
the work of McEliece and Sarwate [15]. We will consider a construction from an arbitrary
code in this paper. The following relation between an arbitrary code (linear or non-linear)
and a ramp scheme is was shown by Paterson and Stinson [16].
Theorem 3.3. Let C be a code of length N , distance d and dual distance d⊥. Let 1 ≤ s <
d⊥−2. Then there is a (τ1, τ2, N−s) ramp scheme , where τ1 = d⊥−s−1 and τ2 = N−d+1.
Here s is the rate of the ramp scheme. If G is a generator matrix of a code C of dimension
k, then |C| = qk ≥ qd⊥−1. In other words, k ≥ d⊥ − 1.
Construction 3.4. The construction of a ramp scheme from a code is as follows. Let s and
ρ be positive integers and let (m1, . . . ,ms) ∈ Fs be the message. Let C be a code of length
n = ρ+ s defined over a finite field F. We also require that the first s entries of a codewords
is the message to be encoded, i.e., the corresponding generator matrix is in standard form.
Select a random codeword (c1 = m1, . . . , cs = ms, cs+1, . . . , cρ+s) ∈ C, and define the shares
as (cs+1, . . . , cρ+s).
Example 3.5. One can use a Reed-Solomon code to construct a ramp scheme [15]. Let
q be a prime and 1 ≤ s < t ≤ n < q. It is well known that, for a prime q, there is an
[N, k,N − τ + 1]q Reed-Solomon code with d⊥ = τ + 1. This implies a (τ − s, τ,N)-ramp
scheme over Fq.
3.2 Single-prover PoR-system
We start by fixing some notation for PoR schemes that we use throughout the paper. Let
Γ be the challenge space and ∆ be the response space. We denote by γ = |Γ| the size of
a challenge space. Let M∗ be the space of all encoded messages. The response function
ρ :M∗ × Γ→ ∆ computes the response r = ρ(M, c) given the encoded message M and the
challenge c.
For an encoded message M ∈M∗, we define the response vector rM that contains all the
responses to all possible challenges for the encoded message M . Finally, define the response
code of the scheme to be
R = {rM : M ∈M∗}.
The codewords in R are just the response vectors that we defined above. Paterson et al. [17]
proved the following result for a single-prover PoR scheme.
Theorem 3.6. Suppose that P is a proving algorithm for a PoR scheme with response
code R. If the success probability of the corresponding proving algorithm satisfies succ(P) ≥
1− d˜/2γ, where d˜ is the Hamming distance of the code R and γ is the size of the challenge
space, then the extractor described in Figure 1 always outputs the message m.
If we cast this in the security model defined in Section 1 (Definition 2.1 and Defini-
tion 2.2), then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.7. Suppose that P is a proving algorithm for a single server PoR scheme with
response code R. Then there exists a (1− d˜/2γ, 0, 1, 1)-MPoR system, where d˜ is the Ham-
ming distance of the code R and γ is the size of the challenge space Γ.
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Paterson et al. [17] gave a modified version of the Shacham-Waters scheme which they
showed is secure in the unconditional security setting. They argued that, in the setting
of unconditionally security, any keyed PoR scheme should be considered to be secure when
the success probability of the proving algorithm P, denoted by succ(P), is defined as the
average success probability of the prover over all possible keys (Theorem 3.8). The same
reasoning extends to MPoR systems. Therefore, in what follows and in Section 6, when we
say a scheme is an (η, ν, τ, ρ)-threshold secure scheme, the term η is the average success
probability where the average is computed over all possible keys. We denote the average
success probability of a prover P over all possible keys by succavg(P). Paterson et al. [17]
showed the following:
Theorem 3.8. Let Fq be the underlying field and let ` ≥ 1 be the hamming weight of the
challenges made by the Verifier. Let d be the hamming distance of the space of encoded
message, M∗. Suppose that
succavg(P) & 1− d
∗(q − 1)
2γq
, (3.1)
where γ = qn is the size of the challenge space and d∗ is given by
d∗ ≈
(
n
`
)
(q − 1)` −
(
n− d
`
)
(q − 1)` −
∑
w≥1
(
d
w
)(
n− d
`− w
)
(q − 1)`
q
. (3.2)
Then there exists an Extractor that always outputs m̂ = m.
4 Worst-case MPoR Based on Ramp Scheme
In this section, we give our first construction that achieves a worst-case security guarantee.
The idea is to use a (τ1, τ2, ρ)-ramp scheme in conjunction with a single-server-PoR sys-
tem. The intuition behind the construction is that the underlying PoR system along with
the ramp scheme provides the retrievability guarantee and the ramp scheme provides the
confidentiality guarantee.
We first present a schematic diagram of the working of an MPoR in Figure 2 and illustrate
the scheme with the help of following example. We provide the details of the construction
in Figure 3.
Example 4.1. Let ρ = 6. Suppose the Verifier and the provers use a PoR system Π. Let the
message to be stored be (15, 3). The Verifier picks q = 17 and chooses two random elements
1, 2 ∈ F17 to construct a polynomial f(x) = 15+3x+x2+2x3. The Verifier picks an encoding
function e(·) and stores e(4) on Prover1, e(7) on Prover2, e(2) on Prover3, e(1) on Prover4,
e(16) on Prover5, and e(8) on Prover6.
Let us suppose that the PoR scheme is such that, for a random challenge vector of dimen-
sion ρ, say
(
5, 2, 9, 13, 5, 6
)
, where the i-th entry would be a challenge to Proveri,
the corresponding responses of the provers form a vector
(
3, 14, 1, 13, 12, 14
)
, where
the Respi is the correct response of the Proveri. In other words, on challenge 5 to Prover1,
the correct response is 3, and so on.
During the audit phase, the Verifier picks any four provers and sends the challenges to the
provers. Once all the provers that he chose reply, he verifies their response. For example,
suppose the Verifier picks Prover1, Prover3, Prover4, and Prover6. The Verifier then sends the
challenge 5 to Prover1, 9 to Prover3, 13 to Prover4, and 6 to Prover6. If it gets the response
3, 1, 13, and 14 back, it accepts; otherwise, it rejects.
We note one of the possible practical deployments of the Ramp-MPoR stated in Figure 3.
Let m be a message that consists of sk elements from Fq. The Verifier breaks the message
into k blocks of length s each. It then invokes a (τ1, τ2, n)-Ramp scheme on each of these
blocks to generate n shares of each of the k blocks. The Verifier then runs a PoR scheme
Π to compute the encoded message to be stored on each of the servers by encoding its k
shares, one corresponding to each of the k blocks.
We prove the following security result for the MPoR scheme presented in Figure 3.
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Message in the form of s bits
Share 1 of
Ramp scheme
Share i of
Ramp scheme
Share ρ of
Ramp scheme
Block stored
on Prover1
Block stored
on Proveri
Block stored
on Proverρ
Π Π Π
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
Figure 2: Schematic View of Ramp-MPoR System
Input: The Verifier gets the message m as input. Let
Prover1, . . . ,Proverρ be the set of ρ provers.
Initialization Stage. The Verifier performs the following steps for
storing the message
1. The Verifier chooses a single-server PoR system Π and a
(τ1, τ2, ρ)-ramp scheme Ramp = (ShareGen,Reconstruct).
2. The Verifier computes ρ shares of the message using the
ramp scheme (m1, . . . ,mρ)← ShareGen(m).
3. The Verifier runs ρ independent copies of Π and generates
the encoded share Mi = e(mi) ∈M corresponding to each
1 ≤ i ≤ ρ.
4. The Verifier stores Mi on Proveri.
Challenge Phase: During the audit phase, Verifier picks a prover,
Proveri, and runs the challenge-response protocol of Π with
Proveri.
Figure 3: Worst-case Secure MPoR Using a Ramp-scheme (Ramp-MPoR).
Theorem 4.2. Let Π be an (η, 0, 1, 1)- threshold-secure MPoR with a response code of Ham-
ming distance d˜ and the size of challenge space γ. Let Ramp = (ShareGen,Reconstruct) be
a (τ1, τ2, ρ)-ramp scheme. Then Ramp-MPoR, defined in Figure 3, is an MPoR system with
the following properties:
1. Privacy: Ramp-MPoR is τ1-private.
2. Security: Ramp-MPoR is (η, 0, τ2, ρ)-threshold secure, where η = 1− d˜/2γ.
Proof. The privacy guarantee of Ramp-MPoR is straightforward from the privacy property
of the underlying ramp scheme.
For the security guarantee, we need to demonstrate an Extractor that outputs a message
m̂ = m if at least t servers succeed with probability at least η = 1− d˜/2γ. The description
of our Extractor is as follows:
1. Extractor chooses τ2 provers and runs the extraction algorithm of the underlying single-
server PoR system on each of these provers. In the end, it outputs M̂ij for the corre-
sponding provers Proverij . It defines S ← {M̂i1 , . . . , M̂iτ2 }.
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Message m
M=e(m)
e
M=e(m)
e
M=e(m)
e
M stored
on Prover1
M stored
on Proveri
M stored
on Proverρ
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
Figure 4: Schematic View of Rep-MPoR
2. Extractor invokes the Reconstruct algorithm of the underlying ramp scheme with the
elements of S. It outputs whatever Reconstruct outputs.
Now note that the Verifier interacts with every Proveri independently. We know from the
security of the underlying single-server-PoR scheme (Theorem 3.6) that there is an extractor
that always outputs the encoded message whenever succ(Pi) ≥ η. Therefore, if all the τ2
chosen proving algorithms succeed with probability at least η, then the set S will have τ2
correct shares. From the correctness of the Reconstruct algorithm, we know that the message
output in the end by Extractor will be the message m.
As a special case of the above, we get a simple MPoR system which uses a replication code.
A replication code has an encoding function Enc : Λ→ Λρ such that Enc(x) = (x, x, . . . , x︸ ︷︷ ︸
ρ times
)
for any x ∈ Λ. This is the setting considered by Curtmola et al. [11].
We call a Ramp-MPoR scheme based on a replication code a Rep-MPoR. The schematic
description of the scheme is presented in Figure 4 and the scheme is presented in Figure 5.
Since a ρ-replication code is a (0, 1, ρ)-ramp scheme, a simple corollary to Theorem 4.2 is
the following.
Corollary 4.3. Let Π be a (η, 0, 1, 1)-MPoR system with a response code of Hamming
distance d˜ and the size of challenge space γ. Then Rep-MPoR, formed by instantiating
Ramp-MPoR with the replication code based Ramp scheme, is a MPoR system with the fol-
lowing properties:
1. Privacy: It is 0-private.
2. Security: It is (η, 0, 1, ρ)-threshold secure, where η = 1− d˜/2γ.
The issue with Rep-MPoR scheme is that there is no confidentiality of the file. We will
come back to this issue later in Section 6.1.
5 Average-case Secure MPoR System
In general, it is not possible to verify with certainty whether the success probability of a
proving algorithm is above a certain threshold; therefore, in that case, it is unclear how the
Extractor would know which proving algorithms to use for extraction as described in Sec-
tion 4. In this section, we analyze the average-case security properties of the replication
code based scheme, Rep-MPoR, described in the last section. This allows us an alternative
guarantee that allows successful extraction where the extractor need not worry whether a
certain proving algorithm succeeds with high enough probability or not.
Recall the scenario introduced in Example 2.3. Here we assumed succ(P1) = 0.9, succ(P2) =
0.6 and succ(P3) = 0.6 for three provers. Suppose that successful extraction for a partic-
ular prover Pi requires succ(P2) ≥ 0.7. Then extraction would work on only one of these
three provers. On the other hand, suppose we have an average-case secure MPoR in which
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Input: The verifier Verifier gets the message m as input. Let
Prover1, . . . ,Proverρ be the set of ρ provers.
Initialization Stage. The Verifier performs the following steps for
storing the message
1. The Verifier chooses a single-server PoR system Π.
2. Using the encoding scheme of Π, the Verifier generates the
encoded message M = e(m) ∈M for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
3. The Verifier stores the message M on all Proveri for 1 ≤
i ≤ n.
Challenge Phase: During the audit phase, Verifier runs the
challenge-response protocol of Π independently on each server.
Figure 5: Average case Secure MPoR (Rep-MPoR).
extraction is successful if the average success probability of the three provers is at least 0.7.
Then the success probabilities assumed above would be sufficient to guarantee successful
extraction.
Theorem 5.1. Let Π be a single-server PoR system with a response code of Hamming
distance d˜ and the size of challenge space γ. Then Rep-MPoR, defined in Figure 5, is an
MPoR system with the following properties:
1. Privacy: Rep-MPoR is 0-private.
2. Security: Rep-MPoR is (1− d˜/2γ, 0, ρ)-average secure.
Proof. Since the message is stored in its entirety on each of the servers, there is no confi-
dentiality.
For the security guarantee, we need to demonstrate an Extractor that outputs a message
m̂ = m if average success probability of all the provers is at least η = 1 − d˜/2γ. The
description of our Extractor is as follows:
1. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, use Pi to compute the vector Ri = (r(i)c : c ∈ Γ), where r(i)c = Pi(c)
for all c ∈ Γ (i.e., for every c, r(i)c is the response computed by Pi when it is given the
challenge c),
2. Compute R as a concatenation of R1, . . . , Rρ and find M̂ :=
(
M̂1, . . . , M̂ρ
)
so that
dist(R, rM̂ ) is minimized, and
3. Compute m = e−1(M̂).
Now note that Verifier interacts with each Proveri independently and Extractor uses the
challenge-response step with independent challenges. Let η1, . . . , ηρ be the success proba-
bilities of the ρ proving algorithms. Let η¯ be the average success probability over all the
servers and challenges. Therefore, η¯ = ρ−1
∑ρ
i=1 ηi.
First note that, in the case of Figure 5, the response code is of the form(r, r, . . . , r︸ ︷︷ ︸
ρ times
) : r ∈ R
 .
It is easy to see that the distance of the response code is ρd˜ and the length of a challenge
is ργ. From the definition of the extractor and Theorem 3.6, it follows that the extraction
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succeeds if
η1 + . . .+ ηρ
ρ
= η¯ ≥ 1− d˜
2γ
.
5.1 Hypothesis Testing for Rep-MPoR
For the purposes of auditing whether a file is being stored appropriately, it is necessary to
have a mechanism for determining whether the success probability of a prover is sufficiently
high. In the case of replication code based MPoR with worst-case security, we are interested
in the success probabilities of individual provers, and the analysis can be carried out as
detailed in Paterson et al. [17]. In the case of Rep-MPoR, however, we wish to determine
whether the average success probability of the set of provers {P1,P2, . . . ,Pρ} is at least η.
This amounts to distinguishing the null hypothesis
H0 : avg-succ(Pi) < η
from the alternative hypothesis
H1 : avg-succ(Pi) ≥ η.
Suppose we send c challenges to each server. If a given server Pi has success probability
succ(Pi), then the number of correct responses received follows the binomial distribution
B(c, succ(Pi)). If the success probabilities succ(Pi) were the same for each server, then the
sum of the number of successes over all the servers would also follow a binomial distribution.
However, we are also interested in the case in which these success probabilities differ, in
which case the total number of successes follows a poisson-binomial distribution, which
is more complicated to work with. In order to establish a test that is conceptually and
computationally easier to apply, we will instead rely on the observation that, in cases where
the average success probability is high enough to permit extraction, the failure rates of the
servers are relatively low.
For a given server Pi, let fi = 1 − succ(Pi) denote the probability of failure. For r
challenges, the number of failures follows the binomial distribution B(c, fi). Provided that r
is sufficiently large and fi is sufficiently low, then B(c, fi) can be approximated by the poisson
distribution Pois(cfi). The poisson distribution Pois(λ) is used to model the scenario where
discrete events are occurring independently within a given time period with an expected rate
of λ events during that period. The probability of observing k events within that period is
given by
P (k) =
e−λλk
k!
.
The mean and the variance of Pois(λ) is equal to λ. For our purposes, the advantage of
using this approximation is the fact that the sum of ρ independent variables following the
poisson distributions Pois(λ1),Pois(λ2), . . . ,Pois(λρ) is itself distributed according to the
poisson distribution Pois(λ1 + λ2 + . . .+ λρ), even when the λi all differ. In the case where
the average failure probability is low, the distribution Pois(c(f1 + f2 + . . . + fρ)) should
provide a reasonable approximation to the actual distribution of the total number of failed
challenges.
Example 5.2. To demonstrate the appropriateness of the Poisson approximation for this
application, suppose we have five servers, whose failure probabilities are expressed as f =
(f1, f2, . . . , f5). Let t be the number of trials per server and b the total number of observed
failures out of the 5t trials. Table 1 give both the exact cumulative probability Pr[B ≤ b] of
observing up to b failures, and the Poisson approximation PrPois[B ≤ b] of this cumulative
probability, for a range of values for f .
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As an example of using the given formula to calculate a confidence interval, suppose we
do 200 trials on each of five servers (so there are 1000 trials in total) and we observe 50
failures in total. Then the resulting confidence interval is [0, 63.29). Suppose we wish to
know whether the success probability is at least η = 0.9. We have (1 − 0.9) × 1000 = 100.
This is outside of that interval, and hence we conclude there is enough evidence to reject H0
at the 95% significance level. However, to test whether the success probability was greater
than 0.95 we see that (1− 0.95)× 1000 = 50. Since 50 lies within the interval, we conclude
there is insufficient evidence to reject H0 at the 95% significance level.
Let b denote the number of incorrect responses we have received from the cρ challenges
given to the provers. Suppose that H0 is true, so that the expected number of failures is
at least ηρc. Based on our approximation, the probability that the number of failures is at
most b is at most
b∑
i=0
e−ηρc(ηρc)i
i!
.
If this probability is less than 0.05, we reject H0 and accept the alternative hypothesis.
However, if the probability is greater than 0.05, then there is not enough evidence to reject
H0 at the 5% significance level, and so we continue to suspect that the file is not being
stored appropriately.
We can express this test neatly using a confidence interval. We define a 95% upper
confidence bound by
λU = inf
{
λ
∣∣∣∣∣
b∑
i=0
e−λλi
i!
< 0.05
}
.
This represents the smallest parameter choice for the Poisson distribution for which the
probability of obtaining b or fewer incorrect responses is less than 0.05. Then [0, λU ) is a
95% confidence interval for the mean number of failures, so we reject H0 whenever ηnr lies
outside this interval. The value of λU can be determined easily by exploiting a connection
with the chi-squared distribution [20]: we have that
b∑
i=0
e−λλi
i!
= Pr(χ22b+2 > 2λ),
and so the appropriate value of λU can readily be obtained from a table for the chi-squared
distribution.
We give a comparison between exact cumulative probability and approximation by Pois-
son distribution in Table 1.
6 Optimization Using the Keyed Shacham-Waters Scheme
In the last three sections, we gave constructions of MPoR scheme using ramp-schemes, linear
secret-sharing schemes, replication codes, and a single-prover-PoR system. In this section,
we show a specific instantiation of our scheme using the keyed-scheme of Shacham and
Waters [17, 18] for a single server PoR system.
6.1 Extension of the Keyed Shacham-Waters Scheme to MPoR
If we instantiate the Rep-MPoR scheme (described in Section 4) with the modified Shacham-
Waters scheme of Paterson et al. [17], then we need one key that consists of n+ 1 values in
Fq. However, in this case, we do not have any privacy. In particular, we have the following
extension of Corollary 4.3.
Corollary 6.1. Let Π be an (η, 0, 0, 1)-PoR system of Shacham and Waters [18] with a
response code of Hamming distance d˜ and the size of challenge space γ (where d˜ is given
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by equation (3.2)). Then Rep-MPoR instantiated with the Shacham-Waters scheme is an
MPoR system with the following properties:
1. Privacy: It is 0-private.
2. Security: It is (η, 0, 1, ρ)-threshold secure, where η = 1− d˜(q−1)2γq .
3. Storage Overhead: Verifier needs to store n+ 1 field elements and every Proveri needs
to store 2n field elements.
Proof. The results follow by combining Theorem 3.8 with Corollary 4.3.
The issue with the Rep-MPoR scheme is that there is no confidentiality of the file. In
what follows, we improve the privacy guarantee of the MPoR scheme described above. Our
starting point would be an instantiation of the Ramp-MPoR scheme, defined in Figure 3,
with the Shacham-Waters scheme. We then reduce the storage on the Verifier through two
steps.
6.2 Optimized Version of the Multi-server Shacham-Waters Scheme
We follow two steps to get a MPoR scheme based on the Shacham-Waters scheme with a
reduced storage requirement for the Verifier, while improving the confidentiality guarantee.
1. In the first step, stated in Theorem 6.2, we improve the privacy guarantee of the MPoR
scheme to get a τ1-private MPoR scheme (where τ1 < ρ is an integer). The Verifier in
this scheme has to store ρ(n+ 1) field elements. When the underlying field is Fq, the
verifier has to store ρ(n+ 1) log q bits.
2. In the second step, stated in Theorem 6.3, we reduce the storage requirement of the
Verifier from ρ(n + 1) to τ1(n + 1) field elements for some integer τ1 < ρ without
affecting the privacy guarantee. When the underlying field is Fq, the verifier has to
store τ1(n+ 1) log q bits.
Step 1. To improve the privacy guarantee of Corollary 6.1 to say, τ1-private (as per
Definition 2.4), we use a Ramp-MPoR scheme and ρ different keys, where each key consists
of n + 1 values in Fq. The Verifier generates ρ shares of every message block using a ramp
scheme, then encodes the shares, and finally computes the tag for each of these encoded
shares.
We follow with more details. Let m = (m[1], . . . ,m[k]) be the message. The Verifier
computes the shares of every message block (m[1], . . . ,m[k]) using a (τ1, τ2, ρ)-Ramp scheme.
It then encodes all the shares using the encoding scheme of the PoR scheme. Let the resulting
encoded shares be Mi[1], . . . ,Mi[n] for 1 ≤ i ≤ ρ. In other words, the result of the above
two steps are ρ encoded shares, each of which is an n-tuple in (Fq)n. The Verifier now picks
random values a(i), b
(i)
1 , . . . , b
(i)
n ∈ Fq for 1 ≤ i ≤ ρ and computes the tags as follows:
Si[j] = b
(i)
j + a
(i)Mi[j] for 1 ≤ i ≤ ρ, 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
The verifier gives Proveri the tuple of encoded messages (Mi[1], . . . ,Mi[n]) and the corre-
sponding tags (Si[1], . . . , Si[n]). We call this scheme the Basic-MPoR scheme. The following
is straightforward from Theorem 4.2.
Theorem 6.2. Let Π be an (η, 0, 0, 1)-PoR scheme of Shacham and Waters [18] with a
response code of Hamming distance d˜ and the size of challenge space γ = qn (where d˜ is
given by equation (3.2)). Let Ramp be a (τ1, τ2, ρ)-ramp scheme. Then Basic-MPoR defined
above is an MPoR scheme with the following properties:
1. Privacy: Basic-MPoR is τ1-private.
2. Security: Basic-MPoR is (η, 0, τ2, ρ)-threshold secure, where η = 1− d˜(q−1)2γq .
3. Storage Overhead: The Verifier needs to store ρ(n+ 1) field elements and every Proveri
needs to store 2n field elements.
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In the construction mentioned above, the Verifier needs to store ρ(n + 1) elements of
Fq, which is almost the same as the total storage requirements of all the provers. The
same issue was encountered by Paterson et al. [17], where the Verifier has to store as much
secret information as the size of the message. This seems to be the general drawback in the
unconditionally secure setting. However, in the case of MPoR, we can improve the storage
requirement of the Verifier as shown in the next step.
Step 2. In this step, we improve the above-described MPoR scheme to achieve considerable
reduction on the storage requirement of the Verifier. The resulting scheme also provides
unbounded audit capability against computationally unbounded adversarial provers, and it
also ensures τ1-privacy.
The main observation that results in the reduction in the storage requirements of the
Verifier is the fact that we can partially derandomize the keys generated by the Verifier. We
use one of the most common techniques in derandomization. The keys in this scheme are
generated by τ1-wise independent functions.
1 Our construction works as follows: we pick
n + 1 random polynomials, f1(x), . . . , fn(x), g(x) ∈ Fq[x], each of degree at most τ1 − 1.
Then the Verifier computes the secret key by evaluating the polynomials fj(x) and g(x) on
ρ different values, say
b
(i)
j = fj(i) and ai = g(i)
for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and 1 ≤ i ≤ ρ. The Verifier then computes the encoded shares and their
corresponding tags as in Basic-MPoR, i.e.,
Si[j] = b
(i)
j + a
(i)Mi[j] for 1 ≤ i ≤ ρ, 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Figure 6 is the formal description of this scheme. For the scheme described in Figure 6,
we prove the following result.
Theorem 6.3. Let Ramp = (ShareGen, Reconstruct) be a (τ1, τ2, ρ)-ramp scheme. Let Π be
a single-prover Shacham-Waters scheme [18] with a response code of Hamming distance d˜
and the size of challenge space γ. Then SW-MPoR, defined in Figure 6, is an MPoR system
with the following properties:
1. Privacy: SW-MPoR is τ1-private.
2. Security: SW-MPoR is (η, 0, τ2, ρ)-threshold secure, where η = 1− d˜(q−1)2γq .
3. Storage Overhead: Verifier needs to store τ1(n + 1) field elements and every Proveri
(for 1 ≤ i ≤ ρ) needs to store 2n field elements.
Proof. The privacy guarantee of SW-MPoR is straightforward from the secrecy property of
the underlying ramp scheme.
For the security guarantee, we have to show an explicit construction of Extractor, that
on input proving algorithms P1, . . . ,Pρ, outputs m if succ(Pi) > η for at least τ2 proving
algorithms. However, there is a subtle issue that we have to deal with before using the proof
of Theorem 4.2, because of the relation between every message and tag pair. It was noted
by Paterson et al. [17] that, if the adversarial prover learns the secret key, then it can break
the PoR scheme. We first argue that a set of τ1 colluding provers cannot have an undue
advantage from exploiting the linear structure of the message-tag pairs.
We now prove that any set of τ1 provers do not learn anything about the keys generated
using n+1 polynomials of degree at most τ1−1. The idea is very similar to the single-prover
case. Paterson et al. [17] noted that in the single prover case, for an n-tuple encoded message,
the key is a tuple of n+1 uniformly random elements (a, b1, . . . , bn) in Fq. Further, from the
point of view of a prover, there are q possible keys – the value of a determines the n-tuple
(b1, . . . , bn) uniquely, but a is completely undetermined. In the MPoR case, we have ρ keys.
1A function is a τ1-wise independent function if every subset of τ1 outputs is independent and equally likely.
It should be noted that this does not imply that all the outputs of the function are mutually independent.
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Input: The Verifier gets a message m = (m[1], . . . ,m[n]) as input.
Let Prover1, . . . ,Proverρ be the set of ρ provers. Let q be a prime
number greater than ρ.
Initialization Stage: The Verifier performs the following steps
1. The Verifier choses n+ 1 random polynomials of degree at
most τ1−1, f1(x), . . . , fn(x), g(x) ∈ Fq[x] and a (τ1, τ2, ρ)-
ramp scheme Ramp = (ShareGen,Reconstruct).
2. For every server i, the Verifier does the following:
(a) Compute ρ shares of every message block using
the share generation algorithm of Ramp as follows:
(m1[j], . . . ,mρ[j])← ShareGen(m[j]) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
(b) The Verifier encodes the message as e(mi[j]) = Mi[j]
for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, 1 ≤ i ≤ ρ.
(c) Compute b
(i)
1 = f1(i), . . . , b
(i)
n = fn(i), a
(i) = g(i).
(d) Compute the tag Si[j] = b
(i)
j +a
(i)Mi[j] for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
3. The Verifier gives {(Mi[j], Si[j])}1≤j≤n to Proveri.
Challenge Phase: During the audit phase, Verifier picks a prover,
Proveri, and runs the challenge-response algorithm of a single-
server Shacham-Waters scheme. It computes the corresponding
keys by computing the random polynomials chosen during the
set up phase.
Figure 6: MPoR Using Optimized Shacham-Waters scheme (SW-MPoR).
Each prover in a given set of τ1 provers has q possible keys, as discussed above. However,
it is conceivable that they can use their collective knowledge to learn something about the
keys. In what follows, we show that they cannot determine any additional information about
their keys by combining the information they hold collectively.
Let I = {i1, . . . , iτ1} be the indices of any arbitrary set of τ1 provers. Let Si denote the
set of possible keys for Proveri, for i ∈ I. Consider any list of τ1 keys (Ki1 ,Ki2 , . . . ,Kiτ1 ).
Recall that Ki (for i ∈ I) has the form
(
a(i), b
(i)
1 , . . . , b
(i)
n
)
, where a(i) and b
(i)
j (for 1 ≤ j ≤ n)
are generated by random polynomials of degree τ1. We first consider a
(i) (for i ∈ I). Note
that the vector
(
b
(i)
1 , . . . , b
(i)
n
)
is defined uniquely by a(i) and the set of all encoded message-
tag pairs. We have already shown that any set of τ1 provers cannot learn anything about
the random polynomial g(x) used to generate the a(i) for all i ∈ I. We use the following
well-known fact to show the any set of τ1 provers do not learn any additional information
about the keys.
Fact 6.4. Let t > 0 be an integer, let q be a prime number, and let Fq be a finite field.
Let h0, h1, . . . , ht−1 ∈ Fq be random elements picked uniformly at random. Define h(x) =∑t−1
i=0 hix
i for all α ∈ Fq. Then,
Pr [h (x1) = y1 ∧ . . . ∧ h (xτ ) = yt] =
t∏
i=1
Pr [h(xαi) = yi] . (6.3)
Since h(x) is uniformly distributed in Fq, the probability computed in equation (6.3) is ac-
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tually equal to q−t.
By construction, g(x) is a random polynomial of degree at most τ1 − 1. Fact 6.4 then
implies that any combination of
{
a(i)
}
i∈I is equally likely. A similar argument, with the
a(i)’s replaced by the b
(i)
j ’s (for all i ∈ I and 1 ≤ j ≤ n) and the polynomial g(x) replaced
by fj(x) (for 1 ≤ j ≤ n), gives that all set of τ1 keys are equally likely. In other words, the
set of provers in the set I cannot determine any additional information about their keys by
combining the information they hold collectively.
We now complete the security proof by describing an Extractor that outputs the file if
τ2 provers succeed with high enough probability. The description of the Extractor and its
analysis is the same as that of Theorem 4.2. We give it for the sake of completeness.
1. Extractor chooses τ2 provers and runs the extraction algorithm of the underlying single-
server PoR system on each of these provers. In the end, it outputs M̂ij for the corre-
sponding provers Proverij . It defines S ← {m̂i1 , . . . , m̂iτ2}. Note that the Extractor of
the underlying PoR scheme has already computed e−1 on the set
{
M̂i1 , . . . , M̂iτ2
}
.
2. Extractor invokes the Reconstruct algorithm of the underlying ramp scheme with the
elements of S˜ to compute m′.
Now note that the Verifier interacts with every Proveri independently. We know from the
security of the underlying PoR scheme of Shacham-Waters that there is an extractor that
always outputs the encoded message whenever succavg(Pi) ≥ η. Therefore, if all the τ2 chosen
proving algorithms succeed with probability at least η over all possible keys, then the set S
will have τ2 correct shares. From the correctness of the Reconstruct algorithm and e
−1(·),
we know that the message output in the end by the Extractor will be the message m.
For the storage requirement, the Verifier has to store the coefficients of all the random
polynomials f1(x), . . . , fn(x), g(x), which amounts to a total of τ1(n + 1) = τ1n + n field
elements.
7 Conclusion and Future Works
In this paper, we studied PoR systems when multiple provers are involved (MPoR). We
motivated and defined the security of MPoR in the worst-case (Definition 2.1) and the
average-case (Definition 2.2) settings, and extended the hypothesis testing techniques used
in the single-server setting [17] to the multi-server setting. We also motivated the study of
confidentiality of the outsourced message. We gave MPoR schemes which are secure under
both these security definitions and provide reasonable confidentiality guarantees even when
there is no restriction on the computational power of the servers. At the end of this paper, we
looked at an optimized version of MPoR system when instantiated with the unconditionally
secure version of the Shacham-Waters scheme [18]. We exhibited that, in the multi-server
setting with computationally unbounded provers, one can overcome the limitation that the
verifier needs to store as much secret information as the provers.
Our paper leaves several open problems. We list two of them below:
1. Our approach works in the privately verifiable setting, i.e., the entity that wishes to
verify the validity of stored data is the same entity that stored the data. It would be
interesting to see if our schemes can be extended to publicly verifiable setting.
2. We assume that the provers do not interact with each other after they receive the
encoded files. There is a vast literature on mitigating collusion. It is an interesting
direction to see if our schemes can be combined with the recent advances in secure
scheme against colluding players in the distributed setting to remove our assumption.
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Table 1: Comparison Between Exact Cumulative Probability and
Approximation by Poisson Distribution
f = (0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1)
t b Pr[B ≤ b] PrPois[B ≤ b]
200 5 2.556545692× 10−38 3.261456422× 10−36
200 10 1.450898832× 10−32 1.137687971× 10−30
200 50 5.995167631× 10−9 2.401592276× 10−8
200 100 0.5265990813 0.5265622074
100 0 1.322070819× 10−23 1.928749864× 10−22
100 5 6.272915577× 10−17 5.567756307× 10−16
100 10 1.135691814× 10−12 6.450152972× 10−12
100 15 1.662665039× 10−9 6.357982164× 10−9
100 20 4.557480806× 10−7 0.000001235187232
200 0 1.747871252× 10−46 3.720076039× 10−44
200 5 2.556545692× 10−38 3.261456422× 10−36
200 10 1.450898832× 10−32 1.137687971× 10−30
200 15 6.757345217× 10−28 3.340076418× 10−26
200 20 5.962487876× 10−24 1.905558774× 10−22
500 20 1.240463044× 10−84 1.084188102× 10−79
500 25 3.140367419× 10−79 1.697380630× 10−74
500 30 2.935666094× 10−74 9.912214279× 10−70
500 35 1.193158517× 10−69 2.542280876× 10−65
500 40 2.369596756× 10−65 3.218593843× 10−61
f = (0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01)
t b Pr[B ≤ b] PrPois[B ≤ b]
200 5 0.06613951161 0.06708596299
200 10 0.5830408032 0.5830397512
200 20 0.9985035184 0.9984117410
200 50 ≈ 1 ≈ 1
f = (0.2, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04)
t b Pr[B ≤ b] PrPois[B ≤ b]
200 5 9.651421837× 10−22 6.180223643× 10−20
200 10 5.539867010× 10−17 1.744235672× 10−15
200 20 0.09020056729 0.1076778797
200 50 0.9999999198 0.9999991415
f = (0.01, 0.01, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05)
t b Pr[B ≤ b] PrPois[B ≤ b]
200 5 8.312224722× 10−8 1.196952269× 10−7
200 10 0.00006809921297 0.00008550688580
200 20 0.06901537242 0.07274102693
200 50 0.9999582547 0.9999397284
f = (0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1)
t b Pr[B ≤ b] PrPois[B ≤ b]
20 0 0.00002656139888 0.00004539992984
20 5 0.05757688648 0.06708596299
20 10 0.5831555123 0.5830397512
20 15 0.9601094730 0.9512595983
20 20 0.9991924263 0.9984117410
40 0 7.055079108× 10−10 2.061153629× 10−9
40 5 0.00003871193246 0.00007190884076
40 10 0.008071249954 0.01081171886
40 15 0.1430754340 0.1565131351
40 20 0.5591747822 0.5590925860
Continued on next page . . .
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Table 1 — continued from previous page
100 20 4.557480806× 10−7 0.000001235187232
100 25 0.00003540113222 0.00007160717427
100 30 0.001002549708 0.001594027332
100 35 0.01231948910 0.01621388016
100 40 0.07508928967 0.08607000083
20 0 0.3660323413 0.3678794412
20 5 0.9994654657 0.9994058153
20 10 0.9999999939 0.9999999900
20 15 1.000000000 1.000000000
20 20 1.000000000 1.000000000
40 0 0.1339796748 0.1353352833
40 5 0.9839770930 0.9834363920
40 10 0.9999931182 0.9999916922
40 15 0.9999999996 1.000000000
40 20 0.9999999999 1.000000000
100 20 0.9999999367 0.9999999198
100 25 0.9999999999 1.000000001
100 30 0.9999999999 1.000000001
100 35 0.9999999999 1.000000001
100 40 0.9999999999 1.000000001
f = (0.02, 0.0075, 0.0075, 0.0075, 0.0075)
t b Pr[B ≤ b] PrPois[B ≤ b]
20 0 0.08936904038 0.09536916225
20 5 0.9712600336 0.9672561739
20 10 0.9999843669 0.9999642885
20 15 0.9999999995 0.9999999958
20 20 1.000000000 1.000000000
40 0 0.007986825382 0.009095277109
40 5 0.6699740391 0.6684384858
40 10 0.9927425867 0.9909776597
40 15 0.9999835852 0.9999661876
40 20 0.9999999935 0.9999999715
100 20 0.9999999935 0.9999999715
100 25 0.9999999998 1.000000001
100 30 0.9999999998 1.000000001
100 35 0.9999999998 1.000000001
100 40 0.9999999998 1.000000001
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c challenge
C⊥ dual of a code C
d∗ distance of the response code
d distance of a codeword
d⊥ dual distance of a code
dist hamming distance between two vectors
G generator matrix of a code
k length of a message
K key (in a keyed scheme)
` number of message-blocks
m message
m[i] i-th message block
m̂ message outputted by the Extractor
M message space
M encoded message
M [i] i-th encoded message
Mj [i] i-th encoded message on Proverj
M∗ encoded message space
n number of provers
N codeword length
Pi proving algorithm of i-th Prover
q order of underlying finite field
r response
rM response vector for encoded message M
S tag (in a keyed scheme)
succ(P) success probability of proving algorithm
R∗ response code
Γ challenge space
γ number of possible challenges
∆ response space
ϕ column sparsity of a matrix
ρ response function
τ privacy threshold
ζ row sparsity of a matrix
Table 2: Notation used in this paper
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